Publications
"Joint Action Without Robust Theory of Mind" (forthcoming in Synthese)
Abstract: Intuitively, even very young children can act jointly. For instance, a child and her parent can build a simple tower together. According to developmental psychologists, young children develop theory of mind by, among other things, participating in joint actions like this. Yet many leading philosophical accounts of joint action presuppose that participants have a robust theory of mind. In this article, I examine two philosophical accounts of joint action designed to circumvent this presupposition, and then I proffer my own novel account of what makes (at least some) interactions between very young children and others joint. I argue that children can take up without deliberation intentions with a joint content that have been transmitted to them by others. In doing so, children can come to share intentions with others, and by acting on these shared intentions they can come to act jointly, all without employing a robust theory of mind.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02386-4
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02386-4
"Interpersonal Moral Luck and Normative Entanglement" (Ergo Volume 6, No. 21, pp. 601-616, 2019)
Abstract: I introduce an underdiscussed type of moral luck, which I call interpersonal moral luck. Interpersonal moral luck characteristically occurs when the actions of other moral agents, qua morally evaluable actions, affect an agent’s moral status in a way that is outside of that agent’s capacity to control. I suggest that interpersonal moral luck is common in collective contexts involving shared responsibility and has interesting distinctive features. I also suggest that many philosophers are already committed to its existence. I then argue that agents who are susceptible to interpersonal moral luck are usually for this reason defeasibly entitled to make demands of those agents who are the source of that luck. This is the phenomenon of normative entanglement. I conclude by discussing some of the important ways in which normative entanglement can shape the norms that govern the actions of agents in collective contexts as well as explain some of our intuitions about what participants in these contexts owe one another.
Link: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0006.021?view=text;rgn=main
Link: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0006.021?view=text;rgn=main
Works in Progress
Directives, Practical Thought, and the Boundaries of Agency
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that socially engaged human agents cannot always be thought of as discrete spheres of intentional activity. This is because human agents have a tendency to act on one another’s intentions and for one another’s reasons, and when this occurs, the actor’s action is an expression of the agency of both the actor and the intender. My argument for the former claim rests on considerations relating to the ways in which directives, which are ubiquitous in ordinary social interactions of all sorts, shape practical thought. My argument for the latter claim concerns the explanatory role that a director’s intentionality plays in the process which produces the action. I demonstrate that my thesis is entirely consistent with—and indeed only intelligible within—an event-causal framework, and I address concerns that acting on another’s intention is inconsistent with autonomy. Finally, I discuss the importance of my thesis for understanding joint action and for elucidating shared and collective responsibility.
Manuscript available upon request
Manuscript available upon request
Life and Death Without the Present
Abstract: Some thinkers and philosophers have suggested that accepting the B-theory of time (according to which times do not objectively have properties like presentness, pastness, or futurity) should affect one’s understanding of the significance of one’s own mortality and death. In this paper, I defend this idea and respond to objections that have been raised to it. B-theory can be a source of consolation to mortals for two reasons. First, B-theorists have less reason to worry about the fact that their time is growing short, because B-theory implies that time does not really pass and therefore does not “grow short” at all. Second, B-theorists can take comfort in that from a certain objective perspective their life and the things they most care about are not utterly obliterated or enervated by death, despite what appearances may suggest.
Manuscript available upon request
Manuscript available upon request
Moral Features of Team-Based Healthcare (with Catelynn Kenner)
Abstract: Hospital-based medical care typically involves teams of healthcare providers working together to address patients’ needs. Such teams regularly perform joint actions that have a great deal of moral significance. A team that heals a patient successfully fulfills some of its obligations to the patient, produces a good outcome, and is likely praiseworthy as a result; a team that makes a medical error contravenes some of its obligations to the patient, may produce a bad outcome, and is likely blameworthy as a result. Healthcare providers who are members of praiseworthy or blameworthy teams sometimes share responsibility (in the sense of being praiseworthy or blameworthy) for the actions of the team or other team members. In this paper, we argue that the potential for shared responsibility in medical contexts has several implications. First, we argue that members of healthcare teams are susceptible to interpersonal moral luck, which characteristically occurs when the actions of other moral agents, qua morally evaluable actions, affect an agent’s moral status in a way that is outside of that agent’s capacity to control. Second, we argue that when a provider, such as a nurse, is susceptible to moral luck in this way, they typically on that basis enjoy special claims against those agents who constitute the source of that luck (usually other providers). This has implications for the norms that govern the actions of providers in team contexts and shapes the systems of entitlements that characterize medical teams.
Manuscript available upon request.
Manuscript available upon request.
Dissertation Abstract: Essays Concerning the Social Dimensions of Human Agency
My dissertation concerns the social dimensions of human agency. I reject the common (although often unstated) presupposition that agents have clear boundaries separating one agent from another. In my view, it often becomes strained to think of interacting agents as functionally discrete spheres of intentional activity. This is because agents regularly act on one another’s intentions and for one another’s reasons. When your intentions and reasons guide and sustain my activities, there is an important sense in which some of my practical mental states and actions are attributable to you as well as to me, and there is no way to sharply distinguish what you are up to from what I am up to without distortion. My agency and yours have become intertwined.
Consider a simple example. Suppose my colleague phones me and asks me to find a document in our shared office. I have no idea where the document is, so my colleague actively directs my search. First, she tells me to check the filing cabinet. Then, she has me check the bookshelf. Finally, she tells me to check her desk, wherein I find the document. She then asks me to scan and email her the document, which I do after hanging up.
My colleague and I jointly searched for the document. But we played very different roles in that search. My colleague was deliberating and directing; I was acting at my colleague’s direction and was guided by my colleague’s intentions and goal. There is a sense in which my actions were an expression of not just my agency, but of my colleague’s as well. It is as if my colleague’s sphere of intentional activity was interpersonally extended such that it overlapped with or twisted around my own intentional activity. We were agentially intertwined.
The first part of my dissertation is dedicated to defending these ideas. I first argue that directives are ubiquitous and integral to good social functioning. Most contemporary philosophers who have written about directives have thought of them as tools for giving others reasons. But this approach fails to capture the distinctive ways that directives and interpersonal authority characteristically shape practical thought. I argue that directing another is a way of communicating one’s intentions for them, and typically when one complies with a directive, one adopts that intention without independent deliberation about what to do, leading to the sort of agential overlap just described.
In the second part of my dissertation, I apply some of these ideas to a problem in developmental psychology. Psychologists hold that joint action is developmentally prior to robust theory of mind. Yet leading philosophical accounts of joint action presuppose that participants have robust theory of mind. I argue that even without a robust theory of mind young children can and often do share intentions and participate in joint action by adopting the communicated intentions of more competent partners who structure and manage interactions for them.
In the final part of my dissertation, I turn to purely moral matters. I introduce interpersonal moral luck, which occurs whenever another’s action, qua action, affects one’s moral status in a way that is outside of one’s capacity to control. I then argue that agents who are susceptible to interpersonal moral luck often for that reason enjoy special claims against those who are the source of that luck. I call this normative entanglement. I suggest that if my views about agency are correct, both phenomena are widespread in human life. This has important implications for our thinking about the nature of moral responsibility and the norms that govern agents in collective contexts
Consider a simple example. Suppose my colleague phones me and asks me to find a document in our shared office. I have no idea where the document is, so my colleague actively directs my search. First, she tells me to check the filing cabinet. Then, she has me check the bookshelf. Finally, she tells me to check her desk, wherein I find the document. She then asks me to scan and email her the document, which I do after hanging up.
My colleague and I jointly searched for the document. But we played very different roles in that search. My colleague was deliberating and directing; I was acting at my colleague’s direction and was guided by my colleague’s intentions and goal. There is a sense in which my actions were an expression of not just my agency, but of my colleague’s as well. It is as if my colleague’s sphere of intentional activity was interpersonally extended such that it overlapped with or twisted around my own intentional activity. We were agentially intertwined.
The first part of my dissertation is dedicated to defending these ideas. I first argue that directives are ubiquitous and integral to good social functioning. Most contemporary philosophers who have written about directives have thought of them as tools for giving others reasons. But this approach fails to capture the distinctive ways that directives and interpersonal authority characteristically shape practical thought. I argue that directing another is a way of communicating one’s intentions for them, and typically when one complies with a directive, one adopts that intention without independent deliberation about what to do, leading to the sort of agential overlap just described.
In the second part of my dissertation, I apply some of these ideas to a problem in developmental psychology. Psychologists hold that joint action is developmentally prior to robust theory of mind. Yet leading philosophical accounts of joint action presuppose that participants have robust theory of mind. I argue that even without a robust theory of mind young children can and often do share intentions and participate in joint action by adopting the communicated intentions of more competent partners who structure and manage interactions for them.
In the final part of my dissertation, I turn to purely moral matters. I introduce interpersonal moral luck, which occurs whenever another’s action, qua action, affects one’s moral status in a way that is outside of one’s capacity to control. I then argue that agents who are susceptible to interpersonal moral luck often for that reason enjoy special claims against those who are the source of that luck. I call this normative entanglement. I suggest that if my views about agency are correct, both phenomena are widespread in human life. This has important implications for our thinking about the nature of moral responsibility and the norms that govern agents in collective contexts