

## DANIEL STORY

### CURRICULUM VITAE

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**Areas of Specialization:** Ethics; Philosophy of Mind; Social Philosophy

**Areas of Competence:** Metaphysics; Epistemology; Logic

### Education

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**Ph.D. in Philosophy** (in progress), University of California, Santa Barbara (expected June 2020)  
**C.Phil. in Philosophy**, University of California, Santa Barbara (2017)  
**M.A. in Philosophy**, University of California, Santa Barbara (2017)  
**B.A. in Philosophy**, University of Kentucky (2013)  
**Associates in Arts**, Bluegrass Community and Technical College (2011)

### Research

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**Dissertation:** Essays Concerning the Social Dimensions of Human Agency

I explore the ways in which the boundaries of individual human agency can be extended interpersonally. I argue that agents regularly borrow the agency of others for their own purposes via the use of directives and that complying with a directive is typically a way of carrying out the director's plans and projects. I propose that very young children participate in joint actions by carrying out the social plans of more competent partners. Finally, I argue that if my views about agency are correct, then one's moral responsibility often outruns one's control, since one will often share responsibility for the actions and designs of others. I suggest this has important implications for the norms that govern interacting agents.

### Publications

- "Joint Action Without Robust Theory of Mind" (forthcoming in *Synthese*)
- "Interpersonal Moral Luck and Normative Entanglement" (forthcoming in *Ergo*)

### Select Presentations & Commentaries

- **"Interpersonal Moral Luck and Normative Entanglement."** *The 6<sup>th</sup> Biennial European Network on Social Ontology Conference*, Tampere University, 2019.
- **"Moral Features of Team-based Medical Care."** (with Catelynn Kenner) *The 13th Philosophy in the Nurse's World Conference & 23rd International Philosophy of Nursing Conference*, Victoria, BC, 2019.
- **"Joint Action without Theory of Mind."** *The 11<sup>th</sup> Biennial Collective Intentionality Conference*, Tufts University, 2018.
- **"Comments on 'The Ability Ought Implies'."** *Pacific APA*, San Diego, CA, 2018

### Select Presentations & Commentaries (cont.)

- **“The Limits of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments of Moral Knowledge.”** *Society for Exact Philosophy*, University of Miami, 2016.
- **“The Evolution of Morality and Doxastic Confidence.”**  
*Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference*, University of Utah, 2016.  
*Georgia State Student Philosophy Symposium*, Georgia State, 2016.  
*Nature and Norms: Values in a Material World*, Johns Hopkins University, 2015.
- **“Modal Realism and the Kennel Club of Philadelphia.”** *Undergraduate Research Showcase*, University of Kentucky, 2013.

### Academic Employment

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#### **Instructor of Record**, UCSB, 2017-2019.

- *Metaphysics*
- *Philosophy of Mind*
- *Theory of Knowledge*
- *Introduction to Ethics*
- *Critical Thinking* (x3)

#### **Teaching Assistant**, UCSB, 2015-2017.

- *Metaphysics*
- *Philosophy of Mind*
- *Theory of Knowledge*
- *Normative Ethics*
- *Critical Thinking*
- *Introduction to Ethics* (x3)
- *Introduction to Philosophy*

#### **Grader**, UCSB, 2015-2016.

- *Punishment and Responsibility*
- *Philosophy of Law*

#### **Research Assistant**, UK, 2012-2013.

- *Department of Jewish Studies*
- *Department of Writing, Rhetoric, and Digital Studies*

### Awards

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**The 22<sup>nd</sup> Annual Charlotte Stough Memorial Award in Philosophy**, UCSB, 2018.

**The Aida and Philip F. Siff Prize in Philosophy for Best Essay by a Philosophy Graduate Student**, UCSB, 2015 & 2017.

**R. W. Church Scholarship**, UCSB, 2015.

**Philosophy Department Fellowship**, UCSB, 2014-2015.

**Trustees Scholarship**, University of Kentucky, 2011-2013.

**Kentucky Educational Excellence Scholarship**, *Kentucky Higher Education Assistance Authority*, 2009-2013.

**Dean’s List**, University of Kentucky, 2011-2013.

**Dean’s List**, BCTC, 2009-2011.

### Professional Affiliations

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**International Social Ontology Society**, member, 2018-present.

**Minorities and Philosophy**, UCSB Chapter, 2014-present.

- Chapter President, 2016-2018.
- Chapter Secretary, 2015-2016.

**American Philosophical Association**, member, 2014-present.

## Professional Service

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**Graduate Student Representative** (joint appointment), *Department of Philosophy*, UCSB, 2016-2018.

**Department Representative**, *Spring Insight Academic Fair*, UCSB, 2016 & 2017.

**Department Representative**, *Diversity Forum*, UCSB, November 2015.

## References

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### **Matthew Hanser**

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### **Dan Korman**

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### **Kevin Falvey**

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### **Abraham Roth**

Professor of Philosophy  
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### **E. Sonny Elizondo**

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## Essays Concerning the Social Dimensions of Human Agency

Daniel Story

My dissertation concerns the social dimensions of human agency. I reject the common (although often unstated) presupposition that agents have clear boundaries separating one agent from another. In my view, it often becomes strained to think of interacting agents as functionally discrete spheres of intentional activity. This is because agents regularly act on one another's intentions and for one another's reasons. When your intentions and reasons guide and sustain my activities, there is an important sense in which some of my practical mental states and actions are attributable to you as well as to me, and there is no way to sharply distinguish what you are up to from what I am up to without distortion. My agency and yours have become intertwined.

Consider a simple example. Suppose my colleague phones me and asks me to find a document in our shared office. I have no idea where the document is, so my colleague actively directs my search. First, she tells me to check the filing cabinet. Then, she has me check the bookshelf. Finally, she tells me to check her desk, wherein I find the document. She then asks me to scan and email her the document, which I do after hanging up.

My colleague and I jointly searched for the document. But we played very different roles in that search. My colleague was deliberating and directing; I was acting at my colleague's direction and was guided by my colleague's intentions and goal. There is a sense in which my actions were an expression of not just my agency, but of my colleague's as well. It is as if my colleague's sphere of intentional activity was interpersonally extended such that it overlapped with or twisted around my own intentional activity. We were agentially intertwined.

My first dissertation chapter is dedicated to defending these ideas. I first argue that directives are ubiquitous and integral to good social functioning. Most contemporary philosophers who have written about directives have thought of them as tools for giving others reasons. But this approach fails to capture the distinctive ways that directives and interpersonal authority characteristically shape practical thought. I argue that directing another is a way of communicating one's intentions for them, and typically when one complies with a directive, one adopts that intention without independent deliberation about what to do, leading to the sort of agential overlap just described.

In my second chapter, I apply some of these ideas to a problem in developmental psychology. Psychologists hold that joint action is developmentally prior to robust theory of mind. Yet leading philosophical accounts of joint action presuppose that participants have robust theory of mind. I argue that even without a robust theory of mind young children can and often do share intentions and participate in joint action by adopting the communicated intentions of more competent partners who structure and manage interactions for them.

In my final chapter, I turn to purely moral matters. I introduce *interpersonal moral luck*, which occurs whenever another's action, qua action, affects one's moral status in a way that is outside of one's capacity to control. I then argue that agents who are susceptible to interpersonal moral luck often for that reason enjoy special claims against those who are the source of that luck. I call this *normative entanglement*. I suggest that if my views about agency are correct, both phenomena are widespread in human life. This has important implications for our thinking about the nature of moral responsibility and the norms that govern agents in collective contexts.