

DANIEL STORY

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Department Address

UCSB Philosophy Department
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Areas of Specialization: Ethics; Philosophy of Mind

Areas of Competence: Feminist Ethics; Metaphysics; Epistemology

Education

Ph.D. in Philosophy (in progress), University of California, Santa Barbara (Summer 2020)

C.Phil. in Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara (2017)

M.A. in Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara (2017)

B.A. in Philosophy, University of Kentucky (2013)

Associates in Arts, Bluegrass Community and Technical College (2011)

Academic Employment

California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, Lecturer	2020-
University of California, Santa Barbara, Teaching Assistant/Associate	2015-2020
University of California, Santa Barbara, Grader	2015-2016
University of Kentucky, Research Assistant (Jewish Studies, Writing)	2012-2013

Teaching Experience

Instructor of Record

- *Feminist Ethics* (2x)
- *Applied Feminist Ethics*
- *Metaphysics*
- *Philosophy of Mind*
- *Theory of Knowledge*
- *Intro to Ethics*
- *Critical Thinking* (5x)

Teaching Assistant

- *Metaphysics*
- *Philosophy of Mind*
- *Theory of Knowledge*
- *Normative Ethics*
- *Critical Thinking* (2x)
- *Intro to Ethics* (3x)
- *Intro to Philosophy* (2x)

Grader

- *Punishment and Responsibility*
- *Philosophy of Law*

Research

Dissertation: Essays Concerning the Social Dimensions of Human Agency

Philosophers who study agency tend to presuppose that individual agents have clear boundaries separating one agent from another. I argue that agents cannot always be thought of as discrete entities in this way, because agents often act on one another's intentions and for one another's reasons. I show that this sort of thing is pervasive amongst adults, and I propose that children first begin to participate in joint actions by carrying out the social intentions of more competent partners. Finally, I argue that if my views about agency are

correct, then one's moral responsibility often outruns one's control, since one will often share responsibility for the actions and designs of others. I then suggest this has important implications for the norms that govern interacting agents.

Publications

- Story, Daniel. "Joint action without robust theory of mind." forthcoming *Synthese*.
- Story, Daniel. "Interpersonal Moral Luck and Normative Entanglement." *Ergo*, vol. 6, no. 21, 2019, pp. 601-616.

Select Presentations & Commentaries

- "Joint Action, Development, and the Boundaries of Agency." *Cal Poly Research Workshop*, 2019.
- "Interpersonal Moral Luck and Normative Entanglement." *The Biennial European Network on Social Ontology Conference*, 2019.
- "Moral Features of Team-based Medical Care." (with Catelynn Kenner) *The Philosophy in the Nurse's World Conference & International Philosophy of Nursing Conference*, 2019.
- "Joint Action without Theory of Mind." *The Biennial Collective Intentionality Conference*, 2018.
- "Comments on Ben Schwan's 'The Ability Ought Implies'." *Pacific APA*, 2018
- "The Limits of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments of Moral Knowledge." *Society for Exact Philosophy*, 2016.
- "The Evolution of Morality and Doxastic Confidence."
Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference, 2016.
Georgia State Student Philosophy Symposium, 2016.
Nature and Norms: Values in a Material World, 2015.
- "Modal Realism and the Kennel Club of Philadelphia." *University of Kentucky Undergraduate Research Showcase*, 2013.

Awards

The 22nd Annual Charlotte Stough Memorial Award in Philosophy, UCSB, 2018.

The Aida and Philip F. Siff Prize in Philosophy for Best Essay by a Philosophy Graduate Student, UCSB, 2015 & 2017.

R. W. Church Scholarship, UCSB, 2015.

Philosophy Department Fellowship, UCSB, 2014-2015.

Trustees Scholarship, University of Kentucky, 2011-2013.

Kentucky Educational Excellence Scholarship, *Kentucky Higher Education Assistance Authority*, 2009-2013.

Dean's List, University of Kentucky, 2011-2013.

Dean's List, BCTC, 2009-2011.

Professional Affiliations

International Social Ontology Society, member, 2018-present.

Minorities and Philosophy, UCSB Chapter, 2014-present.

- Chapter President, 2016-2018.

- Chapter Secretary, 2015-2016.

American Philosophical Association, member, 2014-present.

Professional Service and Activities

Summer Teaching Associate Mentoring Program (with Kevin Falvey), UCSB, 2018.

Graduate Student Representative (joint appointment), *Department of Philosophy*, UCSB, 2016-2018.

Department Representative, *Spring Insight Academic Fair*, UCSB, 2016 & 2017.

Department Representative, *Diversity Forum*, UCSB, November 2015.

References

Dr. Kevin Falvey

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Dr. Dan Korman

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Essays Concerning the Social Dimensions of Human Agency

Daniel Story

My dissertation concerns the social dimensions of human agency. I reject the common and often unstated presupposition that agents have clear boundaries separating one agent from another. In my view, it often becomes strained to think of interacting agents as functionally discrete spheres of intentional activity. This is because agents regularly act on one another's intentions and for one another's reasons. When your intentions and reasons guide and sustain my activities, there is an important sense in which some of my practical mental states and actions are attributable to you as well as to me, and there is no way to sharply distinguish what you are up to from what I am up to without distortion. My agency and yours have become intertwined.

Consider a simple example. Suppose my colleague phones me and asks me to find a document in our shared office. I have no idea where the document is, so my colleague actively directs my search. First, she tells me to check the filing cabinet. Then, she has me check the bookshelf. Finally, she tells me to check her desk, wherein I find the document. She then asks me to scan and email her the document, which I do after hanging up.

My colleague and I jointly searched for the document. But we played very different roles in that search. My colleague was deliberating and directing; I was acting at my colleague's direction and was guided by my colleague's intentions and goal. There is a sense in which my actions were an expression of not just my agency, but of my colleague's as well. It is as if my colleague's sphere of intentional activity was interpersonally extended such that it overlapped with or twisted around my own intentional activity. We were agentially intertwined.

The first part of my dissertation is dedicated to defending these ideas. I first argue that directives are ubiquitous and integral to good social functioning. Most contemporary philosophers who have written about directives have thought of them as tools for giving others reasons. But this approach fails to capture the distinctive ways that directives and interpersonal authority characteristically shape practical thought. I argue that directing another is a way of communicating one's intentions for them, and typically when one complies with a directive, one adopts that intention without independent deliberation about what to do, leading to the sort of agential overlap just described.

In the second part of my dissertation, I apply some of these ideas to a problem in developmental psychology. Psychologists hold that joint action is developmentally prior to robust theory of mind. Yet leading philosophical accounts of joint action presuppose that participants have robust theory of mind. I argue that even without a robust theory of mind young children can and often do share intentions and participate in joint action by adopting the communicated intentions of more competent partners who structure and manage interactions for them.

In the final part of my dissertation, I turn to purely moral matters. I introduce *interpersonal moral luck*, which occurs whenever another's action, qua action, affects one's moral status in a way that is outside of one's capacity to control. I then argue that agents who are susceptible to interpersonal moral luck often for that reason enjoy special claims against those who are the source of that luck. I call this *normative entanglement*. I suggest that if my views about agency are correct, both phenomena are widespread in human life. This has important implications for our thinking about the nature of moral responsibility and the norms that govern agents in collective contexts.